AZ_PRIVILEGED_ROLE_ADMIN

Summary

Forestall ACL Alias	AZ_PRIVILEGED_ROLE_ADMIN
Entra ID (Azure AD) Alias	Privileged Role Administrator
Affected Object Types	Directory roles, role-assignable groups, role assignments (active/eligible), PIM role settings
Exploitation Certainty	Certain
Graph Permission / Role	Membership in the Privileged Role Administrator directory role (direct assignment or via a role-assignable group). Equivalent capability can also exist through Microsoft Graph permissions that allow directory role management (for example RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory).

Description

AZ_PRIVILEGED_ROLE_ADMIN represents the ability for a principal to operate as a Privileged Role Administrator in Microsoft Entra ID.

A Privileged Role Administrator can manage directory roles. This includes creating and removing role assignments. In tenants using PIM, it can manage privileged role assignment workflows and role settings.

By using this role, an attacker can:

• Grant themselves (or a controlled identity) a privileged directory role and gain administrative access.

• Assign privileged roles to a service principal or role-assignable group to create persistence.

• Modify role assignment configuration and governance to reduce controls.

Therefore, any identity that holds the Privileged Role Administrator role can quickly escalate privileges by changing who has privileged roles.

Identification

PowerShell (Microsoft Graph)

List all members of the Privileged Role Administrator role. If a group is assigned, expand it to identify effective users.

Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "RoleManagement.Read.Directory","Directory.Read.All"

# Privileged Role Administrator role template ID
$roleId = "e8611ab8-c189-46e8-94e1-60213ab1f814"

Get-MgRoleManagementDirectoryRoleAssignment -Filter "roleDefinitionId eq '$roleId'" -ExpandProperty Principal | ForEach-Object {
    [PSCustomObject]@{
        PrincipalType = $_.Principal.AdditionalProperties.'@odata.type'.Split('.')[-1]
        DisplayName   = $_.Principal.AdditionalProperties.displayName
        PrincipalId   = $_.PrincipalId
        Scope         = $_.DirectoryScopeId
    }
} | Format-Table -AutoSize

Azure Portal

1. Open Microsoft Entra admin center -> Roles & administrators.

2. Search and open Privileged Role Administrator.

3. Open Assignments and record:

   • Active assignments

   • Eligible assignments (if PIM is enabled)

4. If a group is assigned:

   • Enumerate its transitive members (nested included).

5. If PIM is used:

   • Review role settings, approvals, and activation requirements for privileged roles.

Exploitation

A Privileged Role Administrator can change who holds privileged roles. This is a direct privilege-escalation path.

PowerShell (Microsoft Graph)

Assign Global Administrator to a controlled principal:

Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory","Application.Read.All"

$spName = "<ServicePrincipalDisplayName>"
$sp = Get-MgServicePrincipal -Filter "displayName eq '$spName'" | Select -First 1

New-MgRoleManagementDirectoryRoleAssignment -BodyParameter @{
    principalId      = $sp.Id
    roleDefinitionId = "62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10"  # Global Administrator
    directoryScopeId = "/"
}

Assign Global Administrator to a service principal with PowerShell

Or by user UPN:

Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory","User.Read.All"

$user = Get-MgUser -Filter "userPrincipalName eq '[e-mail]'"
New-MgRoleManagementDirectoryRoleAssignment -BodyParameter @{
    principalId      = $user.Id
    roleDefinitionId = "62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10"
    directoryScopeId = "/"
}

Assign Global Administrator to a user with PowerShell

Common role template IDs for escalation:

Role	Template ID
Global Administrator	62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10
Privileged Authentication Administrator	7be44c8a-adaf-4e2a-84d6-ab2649e08a13
Application Administrator	9b895d92-2cd3-44c7-9d02-a6ac2d5ea5c3
Cloud Application Administrator	158c047a-c907-4556-b7ef-446551a6b5f7

Common Abuse Patterns

• Assigning a privileged role to a controlled user.

• Assigning a privileged role to a controlled service principal or managed identity.

• Assigning a privileged role to a role-assignable group and then adding members to that group.

• Weakening role governance by changing role settings and approval requirements (in PIM-enabled tenants).

Mitigation

• Keep Privileged Role Administrator membership minimal.

• Use PIM:

  • Prefer eligible assignments instead of permanent active assignments.

  • Require MFA and approvals for activation where appropriate.

• Separate duties:

  • Do not combine role-management roles with daily operational accounts.

• Protect role-assignable groups:

  • Strictly control membership and ownership.

  • Monitor all changes to those groups.

• Review privileged role assignments regularly and remove unused access.

Detection

Use the Microsoft Entra admin center:

1. Open Microsoft Entra ID -> Audit logs.

2. Filter Category for RoleManagement.

3. Review activities such as Add member to role, Add eligible member to role, Remove member from role, and privileged role setting changes.

4. Open Roles & administrators -> Privileged Role Administrator -> Assignments to review current assignments and recent activations.

5. Review Initiated by (actor), Target, Date, and Status for unexpected privileged role changes.

References

• https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/permissions-reference

• https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/role-based-access-control/directory-roles-overview

• https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-configure

• https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/rbacapplication-post-roleassignments

• https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities