Summary
| Forestall ACL Alias | AWS_IN_GROUP |
| Edge Type | Relationship |
| Affected Object Types | IAM Users, IAM Groups |
| Exploitation Certainty | Certain |
| AWS IAM Action / Condition | Relationship visibility via iam:ListGroupsForUser; membership changes via iam:AddUserToGroup and iam:RemoveUserFromGroup |
Description
AWS_IN_GROUP means an IAM user belongs to one or more IAM groups.
Group membership is how a user inherits permissions in IAM. A user picks up everything its groups grant:
- Managed policies attached to the group.
- Inline policies defined on the group.
On its own this edge grants nothing to exploit. It matters because it shows where a user’s permissions actually come from. That is what you need to trace an escalation chain, especially alongside AWS_ATTACHED_POLICY.
Identification
AWS CLI
List groups for a user:
aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name TargetUserInspect policy context of a group:
aws iam list-attached-group-policies --group-name TargetGroupaws iam list-group-policies --group-name TargetGroupEnumerate all user-group relationships:
for u in $(aws iam list-users --query 'Users[].UserName' --output text); do aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name "$u" \ --query "Groups[].{User:'$u',Group:GroupName}" --output tabledoneAWS Console
- Open IAM -> Users -> select a user.
- Open Groups tab to review membership.
- Open each group to inspect managed and inline policies.
Exploitation
This edge has no exploit of its own. It is just membership. The privilege impact comes entirely from what the group’s policies grant.
Mitigation
- Keep IAM groups purpose-specific and least-privilege.
- Regularly review group memberships for privileged groups.
- Remove unnecessary user memberships quickly.
- Use temporary role assumption for elevated tasks when possible.
Detection
Monitor CloudTrail for membership changes:
AddUserToGroupRemoveUserFromGroup
Investigate events affecting privileged groups first.