AZ_BUILTIN_PRIVILEGED_ROLE

Summary

FSProtect ACL Alias	AZ_BUILTIN_PRIVILEGED_ROLE
Entra ID (Azure AD) Alias	Built-in Directory Role (Privileged)
Affected Object Types	Users, Groups, Service Principals
Exploitation Certainty	Certain
Graph Permission / Role	Built-in Directory Roles with elevated permissions

Description

AZ_BUILTIN_PRIVILEGED_ROLE represents built-in directory roles in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) that grant significant administrative privileges. These roles are predefined by Microsoft and cannot be modified. Compromise of an account with a privileged built-in role can lead to full tenant takeover.

Tier 0 - Highest Privilege Roles (Full Tenant Control):

Role	Risk Description
Global Administrator	Full control over all aspects of the tenant
Privileged Role Administrator	Can assign any role to any principal
Privileged Authentication Administrator	Can reset any user's credentials including admins

Tier 1 - High Privilege Roles (Significant Access):

Role	Risk Description
Application Administrator	Full control over all applications and service principals
Cloud Application Administrator	Manage cloud apps except App Proxy
Authentication Administrator	Can reset non-admin passwords and MFA
Helpdesk Administrator	Can reset non-admin passwords
User Administrator	Full control over non-admin users and groups
Groups Administrator	Full control over groups
Exchange Administrator	Full control over Exchange Online
SharePoint Administrator	Full control over SharePoint Online
Intune Administrator	Full control over Intune/Endpoint Manager
Azure DevOps Administrator	Full control over Azure DevOps
Hybrid Identity Administrator	Can manage Azure AD Connect and federation settings

Tier 2 - Moderate Privilege Roles (Limited but Impactful):

Role	Risk Description
Security Administrator	Manage security settings and read security data
Conditional Access Administrator	Manage Conditional Access policies
Password Administrator	Reset passwords for non-admins
License Administrator	Manage license assignments
Directory Readers	Read all directory objects
Directory Writers	Modify directory objects

Important: Many of these roles cannot be scoped to Administrative Units and always operate tenant-wide.

Identification

PowerShell

Find All Privileged Built-in Role Assignments

Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "RoleManagement.Read.Directory"

# Define privileged role display names (IsAZPrivileged = true)
$privilegedRoleNames = @(
    "Application Administrator",
    "Application Developer",
    "Attribute Provisioning Administrator",
    "Attribute Provisioning Reader",
    "Authentication Administrator",
    "Authentication Extensibility Administrator",
    "B2C IEF Keyset Administrator",
    "Cloud Application Administrator",
    "Cloud Device Administrator",
    "Conditional Access Administrator",
    "Directory Writers",
    "Domain Name Administrator",
    "External Identity Provider Administrator",
    "Global Administrator",
    "Global Reader",
    "Helpdesk Administrator",
    "Hybrid Identity Administrator",
    "Intune Administrator",
    "Lifecycle Workflows Administrator",
    "Partner Tier1 Support",
    "Partner Tier2 Support",
    "Password Administrator",
    "Privileged Authentication Administrator",
    "Privileged Role Administrator",
    "Security Administrator",
    "Security Operator",
    "Security Reader",
    "User Administrator"
)

# Get all directory roles activated in the tenant
$allRoles = Get-MgDirectoryRole -All

# Filter for privileged roles
$privilegedRoles = $allRoles | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -in $privilegedRoleNames }

Write-Host "Found $($privilegedRoles.Count) privileged roles activated in tenant"

$results = @()

foreach ($role in $privilegedRoles) {
    $members = Get-MgDirectoryRoleMember -DirectoryRoleId $role.Id -All
    
    foreach ($member in $members) {
        $memberType = $member.AdditionalProperties.'@odata.type' -replace '#microsoft.graph.', ''
        $results += [PSCustomObject]@{
            RoleName          = $role.DisplayName
            RoleId            = $role.Id
            MemberName        = $member.AdditionalProperties.displayName
            MemberId          = $member.Id
            MemberType        = $memberType
            UserPrincipalName = $member.AdditionalProperties.userPrincipalName
        }
    }
}

Write-Host "`nFound $($results.Count) privileged role assignments"
$results | Export-Csv -Path ".\PrivilegedBuiltinRoleAssignments.csv" -NoTypeInformation -Encoding UTF8
$results | Format-Table RoleName, MemberName, MemberType -AutoSize

Exploitation

An attacker with a privileged built-in role can perform various attacks depending on the role.

Global Administrator - Full Tenant Takeover

For detailed exploitation techniques and attack scenarios, see AZ_GLOBAL_ADMIN.

Privileged Role Administrator - Role Assignment Abuse

For detailed exploitation techniques and attack scenarios, see AZ_PRIVILEGED_ROLE_ADMIN.

Privileged Authentication Administrator - Credential Reset

For detailed exploitation techniques and attack scenarios, see AZ_PRIVILEGED_AUTH_ADMIN.

Application Administrator - Application Takeover

For detailed exploitation techniques and attack scenarios, see AZ_APP_ADMIN.

Cloud Application Administrator - Cloud App Takeover

For detailed exploitation techniques and attack scenarios, see AZ_CLOUD_APP_ADMIN.

Security Administrator - Security Settings Abuse

For detailed exploitation techniques and attack scenarios, see AZ_SECURITY_ADMIN.

Partner Tier2 Support - Delegated Admin Privilege Abuse

For detailed exploitation techniques and attack scenarios, see AZ_PARTNER_TIER2_SUPPORT.

Password/Helpdesk/Authentication/User Administrator - Password Reset Abuse

For detailed exploitation techniques and attack scenarios, see AZ_RESET_PASSWORD.

Mitigation

• Minimize privileged role assignments:

  • Regularly review who has privileged roles.

  • Remove unnecessary assignments.

  • Use least privilege principles.

• Implement Privileged Identity Management (PIM):

  • Go to Microsoft Entra ID -> Privileged Identity Management.

  • Make privileged role assignments eligible instead of permanent.

  • Require justification and approval for activation.

• Enforce MFA for privileged roles:

  • Create Conditional Access policies requiring MFA for admin roles.

  • Use phishing-resistant MFA methods (FIDO2, Windows Hello).

• Use break-glass accounts for Global Admin:

  • Limit permanent Global Administrator assignments.

  • Maintain emergency access accounts with strong controls.

• Regular access reviews:

  • Go to Identity Governance -> Access Reviews.

  • Review privileged role assignments quarterly.

• Monitor privileged role assignments:

  • Alert on new privileged role assignments.

  • Alert on changes to existing assignments.

Detection

Detect privileged role abuse in Audit logs.

• Go to Microsoft Entra ID -> Audit logs.

• Filter by activities:

  • Add member to role

  • Add eligible member to role

  • Remove member from role

Monitor for:

• New Global Administrator assignments.

• Privileged role assignments to service principals.

• Role assignments outside of change management windows.

• Unusual admin activity patterns.

• Password resets by privileged accounts.

References

• Microsoft Entra Built-in Roles

• Privileged Identity Management (PIM)

• Securing Privileged Access

• Best Practices for Azure AD Roles