GWS_GROUP_MANAGER
Summary
FSProtect ACL Alias
GWS_GROUP_MANAGER
GWS Alias
Group Manager
Affected Object Types
GWS Group
Exploitation Certainty
Certain
Description
GWS_GROUP_MANAGER is a structural edge representing that an identity is a manager of a Google Workspace Group. Group managers occupy the second tier of group authority: they can add and remove members, approve membership requests, and promote existing members to MANAGER. A manager cannot assign the OWNER role, delete the group, or modify group-level settings.
If the group is bound to GCP IAM roles, a manager can add a controlled identity as a member to immediately inherit those permissions. The full escalation chain requires only a single API call: GWS_GROUP_MANAGER → GWS_ADD_GROUP_MEMBER → GCP IAM access.
Manager accounts are frequently overlooked during security reviews because alert policies typically focus on ownership changes. A manager foothold also persists through group ownership transfers — existing manager assignments are not automatically revoked when a group's owner is changed or removed. If the target group is bound to organization-level or folder-level GCP IAM roles, a single manager foothold can yield access across every project in the organization.
Group membership changes by a manager are recorded only in Google Workspace audit logs. Member additions via the Groups UI route to the groups_enterprise stream; additions via the Admin API route to the admin stream. The GCP setIamPolicy event is never triggered.
Identification
gcloud CLI
# Find all GCP-bound groups across the organization
gcloud asset search-all-iam-policies \
--scope='organizations/ORG_ID' \
--query='memberTypes:group' \
--format="table(resource, policy.bindings[].role, policy.bindings[].members)"Google Admin Console
Open Google Admin Console (
admin.google.com) → Directory → Groups.Click on the target group → Members tab.
Filter by Role: Manager to list all group managers.
Exploitation
Mitigation
Convert GCP-bound groups to security groups — restricts all membership management to Super Admins only:
Minimize managers — assign the MANAGER role only when membership delegation is genuinely required. Audit and revoke unnecessary manager assignments regularly.
Audit manager assignments on GCP-bound groups:
Alert on manager-driven member additions on GCP-bound groups — specifically when the actor holds MANAGER (not OWNER or Admin), which is the operational signature of foothold exploitation.
Enable GWS audit log export to Cloud Logging — without this,
groups_enterpriseadditions (via Groups UI) are invisible to GCP-based monitoring.
Detection
Monitor group membership changes in Google Workspace Audit Logs. Pay attention to member additions performed by accounts that hold MANAGER rather than OWNER — these are the signature of manager foothold exploitation.
Google Admin Console
Open Google Admin Console (
admin.google.com) → Reporting → Audit and investigation → Groups Enterprise log events.Filter by Event Name: Add member or Update member (role change to MANAGER).
Check the Actor field — if the actor holds MANAGER (not OWNER or Admin), the foothold is actively being exploited.
Cloud Logging (GCP)
References
https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical-blog/cloud-pentesting/escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-via-open-groups/
https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/groups-in-cloud-console
https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/directory/reference/rest/v1/members
https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest/v1/groups.memberships
https://cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/concepts-event-threat-detection-overview
https://developers.google.com/workspace/admin/reports/v1/appendix/activity/groups-enterprise
https://support.google.com/a/answer/167430
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